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ESSAY
IS THERE A ROLE FOR TAX LAW IN
POLICING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION?
SUSAN J. STABILE*
INTRODUCTION
The public often complains that executives of public corpo-
rations in the United States are overpaid.' Reports of average
chief executive officer ("CEO") compensation in major American
industrial companies exceeding $3.5 million2 and of individual
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. J.D. 1982,
New York University School of Law; B.A. 1979, Georgetown University.
1 See DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 95 (1993) (reporting survey results indi-
cating that more than 75% of Americans find executive compensation levels to be
excessive); Bevis Longstreth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders' Growing Role in Execu-
tive Compensation (pt.1), N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 1992, at 5 (characterizing the reaction
to reports of executive compensation of" ind-numbing proportions' "). For a dis-
cussion of some reasons the issue of executive compensation has received so much
public attention, see Irwin M. Stelzer, Are CEO's Overpaid?, 126 PUB. INT. 26, 26-33
(1997).
2 See CEOs Enjoy Fatter Bonuses This Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1994, at
A98 (reporting results of a survey undertaken by a compensation consulting firm
indicating that in 1994 average CEO compensation in major American industrial
companies was $3.56 million, as compared to $3.28 million in 1993). The median an-
nual pay package for chief executive officers increased from $1.06 million (expressed
in 1993 dollars) in 1983 to $1.92 million in 1993, greater than a 70% increase in real
terms. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP ANiD CONTROL: RETHINKING COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (1995). If one considers
only the two hundred largest American corporations, the figures are even higher.
See Brian Dumaine, A Knockout Year, FORTUNE, July 25, 1994, at 94 (stating that
1993 compensation of the CEOs of the two hundred largest American corporations
averaged $4.1 million).
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CEOs earning compensation of $45 million or more' are met with
the response that no one could be worth that much.4  While at-
tention has primarily been focused on CEO compensation, the
pay packages of other senior executive officers have not gone un-
noticed.'
" See Dumaine, supra note 2, at 94 (reporting 1993 compensation of Sanford I.
Weill of Travelers, Inc.). Widely reported examples of highly compensated CEO's of
1996 include: Lawrence Coss of Green Tree Financial, who earned a total compen-
sation of $102.4 million; Andrew Grove of Intel, who earned $97.5 million; and San-
ford I. Weill of the Travellers Group, who earned $94.1 million. See Jennifer Rein-
gold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1997, at 58. From 1987 through 1993, almost
300 individual corporate executives earned more than $5 million in a given year and
almost 100 earned more than $10 million. See BLAIR, supra note 2, at 88 (reporting
that total annual compensation topped $20 million for 16 executives in 1992 and
1993).
4 Compensation levels of CEOs and other high level executive officers have been
characterized as "eye-popping," "breathtaking," and "scandalous." BOK, supra note
1, at 95. The reaction today parallels the reaction in 1939 to the Treasury Depart-
ment's published list of American executives who earned more than $15,000 a year.
At the height of the controversy caused by that publication, more than half of those
surveyed in a public opinion poll felt that executives were overpaid and simply could
not be worth $15,000 a year. See Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who
Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV. 28, 28-
29 (1992). "There is unease and disquiet and a sense of concern [about] when is
enough enough." Joann S. Lublin, The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1997, at R1
(alteration in original) (quoting Abraham Zaleznik, retired Harvard business profes-
sor).
It is interesting that "[pleople feel, instinctively, that if a movie studio pays a
star $10 million for a single motion picture, the star must be worth that much, but
the public is skeptical that the studio's CEO is worth $10 million for serving in that
capacity for the year." Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation
and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 201 (1996).
5 Other senior executive officers are also compensated generously. Total com-
pensation for various non-CEO executives in 1996 include: $69,608,000 to Sam Wyly
of Sterling Software; $50,865,000 to Frank Lanza of Lockheed Martin; and
$37,697,000 to Richard Kinder of Enron. See Reingold, supra note 3, at 58. In 1996,
a year when Bear Stearns' Chief Executive Officer, James E. Cayne, got a pay pack-
age in excess of $19 million, the company's chairman, Alan C. Greenberg, and its
executive vice president, Warren J. Spector, also got packages of $19 million or
more, and two other executive vice presidents, Alan D. Schwartz and Michael L.
Tarnopol, received $14.6 million and $7.7 million, respectively. See Michael Si-
conolfi, Bear Stearns' 5 Starters Get $81 Million, Beat NBA, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
1996, at C1.
One reason for the large increase in executive compensation over the last dec-
ade is the move toward performance-based compensation, particularly stock options,
which have generated huge returns over the last decade. See Brownstein & Panner,
supra note 4, at 31. For example, John Reed of Citicorp earned a base salary of $4.3
million in 1995 and was awarded stock options amounting to $1.8 million (valued at
grant). Reeds total compensation for 1995 was $6.1 million. However, in 1996,
Reed's base salary was reduced to $3.5 million, but his compensation totaled $10.9
million. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, New Road to Riches is Paid With Options, N.Y.
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When Americans have a complaint, they generally think
something should: be done to address that complaint. Fre-
quently, they think the government should be the one to solve
the problem. One of the ways in which the federal government
has been involved in the area of executive compensation is
through the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), which imposes
limits on the deductibility of both ordinary compensation and
compensation contingent on a change in corporate control. Sev-
eral months ago, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") initi-
ated a case in the United States Tax Court in Washington D.C.
against Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., alleging that the com-
pany owed $190 million in back taxes for "unreasonable compen-
sation" and "excess parachute payments."6 So rarely has the IRS
attacked a major public company's deductions for executive pay,'
that some believe the case telegraphs the IRS's "intent to open a
new chapter in their policing of compensation in public compa-
nies." In addition to whatever actions the IRS takes under cur-
rent law, there have also been proposals made in the last several
years to use the Code more extensively to alter corporate deci-
sions on executive compensation. 9
This Essay examines whether there is a role for the Code in
the policing of compensation paid to executives of public corpo-
rations"0 in the United States. Part I examines attempts under
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, § 3, at 1; see also BLAIR, supra note 2, at 92 (explaining that
the large pay increases in the last 10 years are the result of the shift toward the use
of stock options; stock options are the largest component of long-term compensation,
and in nearly every case where total compensation in 1992 exceeded $5 million, a
significant portion of the income was attributable to the exercise of stock options);
Brownstein & Panner, supra note 4, at 31 (arguing that, if one examines "some of
the most controversial pay packages, it is the stock element rather than base pay
that accounts for the largest total compensation amounts"); Daniel Kadlec, How
CEO Pay Got Away, TIME, Apr. 28, 1997, at 59 (declaring that the packages that
give "astronomical amounts" to CEOs are those heavily composed of stock options).
6 Joann S. Lublin & Lucette Lagnado, Columbia Tax Fight Could Set Pay
Precedents, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B1 (according to papers filed by IRS in
U.S. Tax Court).
' This case is "one of the rare times" that the IRS has instituted an action re-
garding a "major public company's deductions for executive pay," and is the largest
claim ever involving a public concern's executive pay deductions. Id. at B5.
" Id. (quoting Robert Salwen, president of New York consulting firm, Executive
Compensation Corp.).
' See Brownstein & Panner, supra note 4, at 34 (discussing a bill proposed by
former Congressman Martin Sabo to disallow tax deductions for excessive executive
salaries).
'0 Corporate law scholarship has sometimes been criticized for focusing too
heavily on publicly-held corporations, to the exclusion of closely held businesses,
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current law to use the Code as a means of addressing perceived
abuses in executive compensation. Part II examines whether the
Code should be used as a vehicle for policing executive compen-
sation. The conclusion of this Essay is that the Code should not
be used as a means of attempting to influence the amount or
type of compensation a company pays its executives in absolute
terms or in relation to the compensation a company pays its rank
and file employees. Unless Congress and the IRS are able to ar-
ticulate and defend a different goal in relation to executive com-
pensation, there is no role for the Code in this area.
I. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO USE THE CODE AS A MEANS OF
POLICING EXEcUTIVE COMPENSATION
Section 162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a
taxpayer to take a deduction for "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses, including "a reasonable allowance for salaries or
other compensation for personal services actually rendered."1'
Treasury Regulations promulgated under section 162 expand the
statutory language by providing that the "test of deductibility in
the case of compensation payments is whether they are reason-
able and are in fact payments purely for services."' Although
the Regulations seem on their face to envision a two-part test, in
reality, the primary inquiry is whether the amount of compen-
sation in question is reasonable, since courts will infer from that
through which much of the commerce in this country is carried on, and to the ex-
clusion of other forms of organizations. See, e.g., Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law
and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era of Downsizing and Cor-
porate Reengineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1695-96, 1705 (1996). Although focusing
on publicly-held corporations ignores a significant amount of business in this coun-
ty, when discussing executive compensation, the focus on publicly-held corpora-
tions is a sensible one. Unlike publicly-held corporations, closely-held corporations
are generally run by the investing shareholders. Thus, they more closely resemble
partnerships than publicly-held corporations, meaning there is less need than in a
publicly-held corporation to be concerned with parties' allocations of compensation
and profit. Additionally, because compensation in closely-held corporations is often a
vehicle to transfer investment returns to shareholders, the IRS is an aggressive
monitor of compensation in privately-held entities. See infra note 15 and accompa-
niftext.
26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (1994).
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (1997). In making the determination whether com-
pensation is reasonable, the Regulations explain that a reasonable amount is one
that would result from an arms-length bargain between the employer and the em-
ployee and that reasonable compensation is limited to the amount that would ordi-
narily be paid by an enterprise under like circumstances. See id. §1.162-7(b).
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conclusion the existence of a compensatory purpose."3
Section 162(a)(1) appears to operate as a restriction on the
amounts that may be paid to executives. The language of the
statute and the regulations certainly gives the IRS the authority
to disallow deductions for compensation that is viewed to be un-
reasonable. The ERS, however, has not aggressively utilized this
authority. There are few cases, none of them recent (with the
exception of the recently initiated action against Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp.), in which the IRS has challenged compensa-
tion paid to executives of publicly-held companies. 4 IRS efforts
to disallow deductions for compensation have generally been tar-
geted at close corporations, where the executive is essentially
setting her own salary and the allegation is that the amounts
paid are unreasonable or are really disguised dividends and not
compensation. 5 Although it is conceivable that the IRS's at-
" See Clymer v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCII) 1576, 1576, affid by Denison
Poultry & Egg Co. v. Commissioner, 47 TCM (CCH) 1576 (1984); Elliots, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1983), a/'d by Elliots, Inc. v. C.I.R.
Serv., 899 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1986).
14 Four examples of cases involving challenges to compensation paid in publicly-
held corporations include: R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States, 149 F. Supp.
889 (Ct. Cl. 1957), affd, 260 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1958); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Pfeifer Brewing Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1952); and Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 28
(1948). In two of the cases, Pfeifer Brewing Co. and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.,
compensation was found to be reasonable. See Pfeifer Brewing Co., 11 T.C.M. (CCII)
at 597 and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 132 F. Supp. at 717. The third, R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., was not so much an issue of excessive compensation as it was
a claim that the method for allocating stock under a bonus arrangement made the
stock distribution more like a dividend than a compensation payment. See R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., 260 F.2d at 12. The final case, Patton, involved a suspicion that
the employer and not the employee actually kept the compensation. See Patton, 168
F.2d at 29.
15 See RTS Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1989), affd by
Holt v. C.I.R., 899 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1990); Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987); Trinity Quarries, Inc. v. United States, 679
F.2d 205 (11th Cir. 1982); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982);
see also GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 89 (1991) (concluding that the
IRS only gets involved in situations where a small number of executives own all, or
almost all, of a company's shares and are in a position to engage in self-dealing);
Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the
Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 257 (1983) (stating that the primary motivation of the
IRS in pursuing corporate compensation cases is to prevent owner-entrepreneurs
from passing to themselves, in the guise of deductible salary, non-deductible divi-
dends); Charles A. Barragato, Sustaining a Deduction for Reasonable Compensa-
tion, 61 CPA J. 10 (May 1991) ("The IRS salivates over the prospects of unreason-
able compensation to the employee/shareholder.").
There is some support in the section 162 regulations for the IRS's position. The
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tempt to recover back taxes from Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. could indicate an intent on the part of the IRS to be more
aggressive in challenging pay in public corporations, this is un-
likely. That case involved a peculiar fact pattern of options
granted to executives and managers as part of a management-
led leveraged buyout and involved claims of violations of section
280G of the Code. 6 There is nothing in that case that indicates
an intent by the IRS to use section 162 to challenge compensa-
tion of public corporations in ordinary settings.
In 1993, as part of the Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation
Act, 7 Congress amended section 162 to provide that annual com-
pensation paid to the CEO and the four other highest paid offi-
cers of public companies which exceeds $1 million may not be
deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 8 The
regulations specifically mention that an "ostensible salary paid by a corporation may
be a distribution of a dividend on stock." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1997). The
Regulations also suggest that this is likely to occur in the case of close corporations.
See id. Finally, Treasury Regulation § 1.162-7(a)(2) states that contingent payment
contracts made pursuant to a free bargain will generally not be challenged even
though the amounts turn out to be unusually large.
1 See Lublin & Lagnado, supra note 6, at B5. The stock options in question
were granted to 111 executives and managers and resulted in $426 million in de-
ductions. See id. For a discussion of section 280G, see infra text accompanying notes
28-43.
It is also not clear to what extent, if any, the IRS's decision to go after Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare is related to the ongoing investigation by the federal govern-
ment and at least eleven states into the company's Medicare billing practices. See,
e.g., Columbia/HCA Case Lopsided, Lawyer Says, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 1997, at
8B.
17 Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71 (Aug. 10, 1993).
18 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1) (1994). "In the case of any publicly held corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration
with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remu-
neration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000." Id.
For purposes of the $1,000,000 limit, "publicly held corporation" means any corpo-
ration that has a class of securities that are required to be registered under section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(2) (1994).
It is clear that § 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue-raising provision,
but a behavior-shaping provision. The exception for performance-based compensa-
tion 'is not a loophole.'" Megan M. Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Execu-
tive Compensation Cap, 62 TAX NOTES 747 (Feb. 3, 1994) (citing Catherine Creech,
former Treasury benefits tax counsel). In fact, Congress' estimates of the additional
tax revenue that would be generated in 1995 as a result of 162(m) was only $55 mil-
lion. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1st SESS., ESTIMATED
BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 22641 (Comm. Print 1993).
Thus, Congress' aim in enacting § 162(m), along with its exception for performance-
based pay was to encourage performance-based compensation. See id.; see also Ex-
ecutive Compensation Hearings on S.2298, H.R. 4727 and H.R. 5260 Before the Sub-
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$1 million limit on deductibility is subject to a number of excep-
tions, including an exception for compensation that hinges on the
"attainment of one or more performance goals."19 Such compen-
sation is excepted from the statutory limit so long as such goals
are established by a compensation committee composed of out-
side directors, approved by shareholders, and certified by the
company's compensation committee as having been met.20
Despite the hype during the 1992 Presidential campaign
that preceded President Clinton's recommendation to cap the
deductibility of compensation,21 section 162 will have little effect
comm. on Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong. 2 (1992) (statement
of Sen. Boren) ("We would be less concerned about the amount of compensation
paid to executives if we believed that pay tracked performance."); H.R. REP. No.
103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 877 ("[Elxcessive compensa-
tion will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-
based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly-held corporations is lim-
ited to $1 million per year.").
'9 26 U.S.C § 162 (m)(4)(C) (1994).
20 See id. Regulations adopted in 1995 clarify that a preestablished performance
goal "must state, in terms of an objective formula or standard, the method for com-
puting the amount of compensation payable to the employee if the goal is attained."
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(ii) (1994). The Regulations also prohibit discretion to
increase the amount of compensation to be paid under the preestablished perform-
ance goal. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iii)(A) (1994). The Treasury Regulations
provide examples of performance goals such as making a certain settlement in liti-
gation and bonuses contingent on achieving specific sales or profit goals. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii) (1997). Further, performance goals might include, for ex-
ample, a goal to adhere to the status quo or not to lose money. See Remy, supra note
18, at 747; see also infra note 25.
There are exceptions to the operation of section 162(m) other than the excep-
tion for performance-based compensation. The $1 million deduction limit does not
apply to compensation paid by a privately-held corporation or to compensation paid
under a plan or agreement that existed while a corporation was privately-held, even
if the company subsequently becomes publicly-held. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1)
(1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(i) (1997). The privately-held exception is a reasonable
one because the IRS is more willing to challenge compensation as disguised dividend
in that context. In addition, it only covers compensation paid to the CEO and the
other four most highly paid executives (i.e., those executives whose compensation
must be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission and publicly disclosed
in proxy materials). See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(3) (1994). And even those executives are
subject to the limit only if they are employed on the last day of the corporation's
taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(c)(2)(i) (1994). The $1 million limit also does
not include employee remuneration that is payable "on a commission basis solely on
account of income generated" by the officer's performance, 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(B)
(1994), and certain income agreed to or deductible prior to 1994. See 26 U.S.C. §
162(m)(4)(D) (1994). See generally Kevin J. Ryan, Rethinking Section 162(m)s Limi-
tation on the Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15
VA. TAX. REV. 371 (1995) (discussing the mechanics of, and exceptions contained in,
section 162(m)).
21 See, e.g., Amanda Bennett, Clinton Victory Wouldn't Slash Top Officer Pay,
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on the amount paid to executives. First, some companies who
wish to pay salaries in excess of $1 million will simply ignore the
statutory limit and do without the tax deduction for the excess.'
Second, even for those companies for whom preserving the de-
duction is important, the performance-based compensation ex-
ception to the $1 million limit renders section 162(m) virtually
meaningless. As a result of the public attention focused on the
compensation of executives, large public corporations have al-
ready shifted away from high base salaries and assured annual
bonus pay, and towards performance-based compensation.' In-
come from stock options,' the most popular form of performance-
based compensation, will by definition be excluded from the $1
million limit, as will most amounts paid pursuant to short-term
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at B1 (discussing Clinton plan to eliminate corporation
tax deduction on executive pay in excess of $1 million).
See id. (stating that companies are more likely to choose to forego the deduc-
tion than to cut compensation); Michelle L. Johnson, Forget the Rhetoric - Executive
Pay Fell For Many in '91, INV. BUS. DAILY, Mar. 13, 1992, at 8 (noting that limiting
deduction for compensation will result in a double hit to shareholders because com-
panies will opt to give up the tax deduction); Joann S. Luben, Firms Forfeit Tax
Break to Pay Top Brass $1 Million-Plus, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at B1 (reporting
that an examination of proxies of 91 large companies by consultants Pearl Meyer
and Partners, Inc. reveals that about one-third of the companies have decided to pay
what they want and do without the deduction rather than seek shareholder ap-
proval for certain pay plans or keep compensation at the $1 million limit); The
Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R15 (citing to a review of 1995 proxy
statements by compensation consultant William M. Mercer, which noted that only
38 of 350 companies surveyed paid a base salary in excess of $1 million).
2 See BOK, supra note 1, at 108 (1993) (stating that CEOs of Fortune 500 com-
panies receive about 75% of their annual compensation in bonuses, stock options,
restricted stock and other forms of performance-related pay); Linda J. Barris, The
Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68
IND. L.J. 59, 64 (1992) (illustrating that long-term incentive compensation ac-
counted for a third of total CEO pay in 1991, compared to 8% in 1985); Jack L. Le-
derer & Carl R. Weinberg, Harnessing Corporate Horsepower: The New Principles of
CEO Compensation, CHIEF EXEc. 32 (Sept. 1, 1995) (discussing that Chief Execu-
tive's annual corporate survey reveals an increase in the number of CEOs accepting
bothpay-for-performance and more substantial downside risk).
2 A stock option grants the holder of the option the right (but not the obliga-
tion) to purchase a number of shares of company stock at a price that is fixed at the
date of grant. That price, the option exercise price, is typically the fair market value
on the date of grant of the shares subject to the option. Generally, options become
exercisable over time and when they become exercisable, they remain so for a period
of usually ten years. See generally Joseph Bankman, The UCLA Tax Policy Confer-
ence: The Structure of Silicon Valley Start Ups, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1737, 1750 (1994);
Michael W. Melton, Symposium: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: The Al-
chemy of Incentive Stock Options-Turning Employee Income Into Gold, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492-93 (1983).
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incentive plans.' Base compensation and guaranteed bonuses
will be all that is covered. Thus, companies wishing to preserve
the compensation deduction can structure their compensation
arrangements so that the largest portion thereof is excluded
from the limit.
As a result, according to IRS figures, not only has section
162(m) not resulted in a decrease in executive compensation, but
"executive pay actually rose at a 29 percent faster rate in the
first year after the law took effect than in the previous 14 years
that the service had collected comparable information." 6 From
1994 to 1995, corporate deductions for executive pay increased
more than 9.1%, compared with an average increase of 7% be-
tween 1980 and 1994.27
Another provision regulating executive compensation is sec-
tion 280G of the Code, enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984,2 which aims at imposing some limit on golden para-
chutes. It has become commonplace for companies to offer ex-
ecutives quite generous severance packages"0 and payments
25 Short-term incentive compensation plans generally provide for an annual
payment to executives based on certain measures of company and individual per-
formance during the previous year. Generally, such a plan will establish bench-
marks for performance in certain categories, such as earnings per share, return on
assets or return on equity. If the company achieves those benchmarks, a certain bo-
nus is paid. If the benchmark is exceeded, a larger bonus is paid; if it is not met, ei-
ther a smaller or no bonus is paid. See generally IRA R. KAY, VALUES AT THE TOP:
SOLUTIONS TO THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CRISIS 189 (1992); William E. Lissy &
Marlene L. Morgenstern, Current Trends in Compensation & Benefits, 27 COMP. &
BEN. REV. 10 (1995).
2" David Cay Johnston, Executive Pay Increases at a Much Faster Rate Than
Corporate Revenues and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at D4.
27 See id. (quoting IRS figures); see also Ryan, supra note 20, at 396 (concluding
that the impact of section 162(m) "thrusts" inefficiency and excess in corporate gov-
ernance into American business).
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 280G,
4999).
A golden parachute is an executive termination agreement between an ex-
ecutive and his corporation providing special enhanced severance benefits in the
event an executive is terminated as a result of a hostile takeover of the corporation.
Frequently, such agreements provide for a large cash payment and accelerated
vesting for any outstanding stock options and stock bonus grants as well as other
fringe benefits, such as continued insurance benefits for some period of time. See R.
WINTER, ET AL., SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES 425-28 (1983).
so See Nikhil Deogun, Delta to Pay Sum of $4.5 Million to Former Chief, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 23, 1997, at B12 (reporting that Delta paid its former chairman, presi-
dent, and CEO a lump-sum severance payment of $4.5 million); see also News:
Analysis & Commentary: Where Parting is Such a Sweet Deal, BUS. WK., Mar. 31,
1997, at 42 (citing numerous examples of rich severance arrangements, including
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made to those executives who terminate employment in connec-
tion with a change in control are even more extravagant."' Sec-
tion 280G aims at controlling the latter.
3 2
Section 280G dictates that a payment contingent on a
change in ownership or effective control of the corporation or in
the ownership of a substantial portion of the corporation's assets
that provides an executive with payments greater than or equal
to three times the executive's total annual compensation is pre-
sumed excessive for tax purposes." As a result, the corporation
Phillip B. Rooney, who will receive $2.5 million in each of the next five years after
stepping down as CEO of WMX Technologies Inc. due to pressure from investor
George Soros; John W. Amerman, who upon retiring as CEO of Mattel Inc. received
a special achievement award of $370,000 and was named a part-time senior advisor
to the new CEO, with a remuneration of $1.1 million a year; Roy R. Irani of Occiden-
tal Petroleum Corp., who in 1991 negotiated a deal that will pay him 50% of his
highest annual compensation, including salaries, bonus and restricted stock, to be
paid for life, commencing upon retirement; and Joel B. Alvord, who, upon losing his
position as Shawmut National Corp. CEO as a result of Fleet Financial's purchase of
Shawmut, received a severance package of $15.5 million in cash and options as well
as a $1.5 million payment in 1996). The Business Week article cites Carol Bowle,
editor of Executive Compensation Reports, who stated that the amounts currently
being awarded to departing executives are a measure of what the market will bear.
See id. Another suggestion is that lavish severance arrangements are the result of
greater job insecurity at the executive level. See id.
Some of these generous severance arrangements are difficult to understand,
since they involve forcible terminations. See ANDREW HACKER, MONEY: WHO HAS
HOW MUCH AND WHY 112 (1977) (stating that Borden's board gave an ousted CEO
an extra 100,000 stock options and W.R. Grace provided its ousted CEO with an
$849,000 annual pension for life); Denise Caruso, Technology: Digital Commerce:
Apple's Executive MacMath: The Greater the Loss, the Greater the Salary, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1997, at D5 (describing a series of lavish severance payments to de-
posed Apple CEOs, including a $3 million severance package for John Sculley; be-
tween $3 and $4 million paid to Michael Spindler, "who presided over one of the
company's steepest declines," and, more recently, about $7 million to be paid to the
most recently terminated CEO, Amelio).
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 843-47; infra text
accompanying notes 38-39; see also Henry F. Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute"
Agreements: the Taxman Cuts the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 51 (1985)
(detailing the argument that payments relating to changes of control are a waste of
corporate assets).
32 See DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE ON MAR. 21, 1984, 175, 195-96 (Comm. Print 1984); GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984, H.R. 4170, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. 174, 199-207 (Joint Comm. Print 1984); H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 98-861, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1537-42; see also
Johnson, H., supra note 31, at 56-60 (stating that Tax Reform Act of 1984 (including
section 280G) imposes penalties upon excessive compensation packages that "are
triggered as a result of a change in corporate ownership").
See 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A) (1994).
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loses its deduction for the golden parachute payments and a 20%
excise tax is imposed on the executive receiving the payment. 
4
The aim of section 280G is to make excessive parachute pay-
ments financially prohibitive to a corporation.35
Whatever one thinks of the merits of limiting golden para-
chute payments,38 section 280G is of limited effect for several
4 See id. §§ 280G & 4999.
Congress had two thoughts in enacting section 280G. Congress was concerned
both that the existence of lucrative golden parachute agreements discouraged take-
overs, resulting in management entrenchment, and that the potential receipt of a
generous parachute payment might cause management to favor a takeover not in
the best interests of shareholders. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 199 (Comm. Print 1984); see also Jonathan R.
Macey, Wealth Creation as "Sin," 17 CORP. BD. 12 (July 17, 1996) (arguing that sec-
tion 280G focuses on remedying a perceived corporate governance problem rather
than refining the definition of "ordinary and necessary" business expense).
36 Section 280G has its critics. "Golden parachutes" are defended by some as a
tool facilitating the attraction and retention of good executives, maximizing the ef-
fectiveness of the corporation's financial investment in future employment security,
promoting objectivity among executives, particularly when faced with a threat of a
change in control, and discouraging attempts by employees to block takeovers as
well as unfriendly takeover attempts of well-managed companies by inefficient bid-
ders. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Cor-
porate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 75-76 (1986) (explaining the benefits of the golden
parachute approach as compared to the general grant of risk premiums and contrac-
tual protections to the corporation's management); Johnson, H., supra note 31, at
47-55 (outlining the arguments advanced by golden parachute proponents, including
the retention of well-qualified executives and the elimination of personally-biased
and subjective executive decisions); Kenneth C. Johnson, Golden Parachutes and the
Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909,
914-18 (1985) (highlighting the economic benefits and general effectiveness of golden
parachute agreements); Drew Harrison Campbell, Note, Golden Parachutes: Com-
mon Sense from the Common Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 282 (1990) (describing the
effects of the golden parachute in maximizing the objectivity of corporate executives
and in promoting the interests of shareholders). In addition, the fact that stock
prices increase by an average of 3% when a company announces the adoption of a
golden parachute provision "supports the contention that golden parachutes benefit
shareholders by removing managers' incentives to block economically efficient take-
overs." Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125, 128. But see Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 285 n.114
(1984) (arguing that golden parachutes "create a perverse incentive [because] ...
[tihe employee-manager may be better off if an acquisition takes place[,] even on
terms that make the shareholder worse off'); Johnson, H., supra note 31, at 50-55
(suggesting that the arguments in favor of golden parachutes are flawed and that
such agreements are more detrimental than beneficial); David W. Leebron, Games
Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 183 n.105
(1986) (positing that golden parachute arrangements effectively reduce the tendency
of management to strongly bargain over terms, leading invariably to less frequent
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reasons. First, it affects only payments that are contingent on a
change in control. Therefore, it affects only a small percentage of
compensation payments. Moreover, section 280G may be coun-
terproductive if the goal of the section is limiting compensation.
Fear of triggering the loss of deduction and imposition of an ex-
cise tax may prompt companies to pay executives more in the
form of signing bonuses or increased annual income instead of
providing for payments contingent on a change in control."
Since change in control payments may never get triggered, re-
placing them with guaranteed payments actually increases com-
pensation costs to the company.
Second, section 280G contains a number of exceptions even
with respect to compensation that is contingent on a change in
control. The statute does not penalize payments in excess of
three times the executive's compensation which are established
by clear and convincing evidence to be reasonable compensa-
tion.8 Additionally, payments under qualified plans and options
granted more than one year prior to a change in control are ex-
cluded.39
opposition and a decrease in acquisition prices).
87 See Johnson, H., supra note 31, at 63 (suggesting that employers may be en-
couraged by section 280G either to guarantee an executive continued employment or
to grant top prospects cash bonuses "up front" as additional consideration for ac-
cepting a job with the corporation). Professor Johnson also suggests that corpora-
tions could avoid the application of section 280G by establishing sizable annuities
for key executives. See id. at 63-64. This is possible because of the exclusion from
the operation of section 280G for payments made to or from a qualified pension,
profit-sharing, stock bonus, or annuity plan. See 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(6) (1997).
Though all payments under a golden parachute agreement are presumed ex-
cessive, that presumption is rebuttable. See 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(4) (1994). The
drafters of the legislation did not believe that it would be easy to demonstrate that
parachute payments constitute reasonable compensation. See H.R. CoNF. REP. 98-
961, at 757, 852 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1540 (indicating that
the drafters contemplated that only in rare cases, if any, would any portion of a
parachute payment be treated as reasonable compensation).
The view of the courts on this matter is unclear, though the courts clearly place
the burden of proof on the taxpayer to demonstrate reasonableness. See Cline v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 480, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that payment was not
reasonable compensation because the executives failed to establish the granting of
bonuses and increases in payments in the past); Balch v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.
331, 349 (1993) (explaining that the petitioners failed to establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the payment was reasonable compensation by considering
three critical factors: the history of the individual's compensation, the contractual
duties, and comparable compensation in a non-acquisition setting).
See 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(6) (1994); see also Susan Lorde Martin, The Executive
Compensation Problem, 98 DiCK. L. REV. 237, 245-46 (1994) (criticizing the exclu-
sion of parachute payments).
[Vol. 72:81
1998] EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND TAX LAW 93
The amount executives have received under golden para-
chute agreements in the years since the enactment of section
280G provides the ultimate evidence of the limited effect of the
statute. As an illustration, the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco
in 1988 resulted in golden parachute payments of $53,800,000 to
Chief Executive Officer F. Ross Johnson, $45,700,000 to Vice
Chairman E.A. Horrigan, and $18,200,000 to Executive Vice
President John D. Martin.' In the same year, the takeover of
Primerica by Commercial Credit resulted in golden parachute
payments of $46,800,000 to Primerica's Chairman, Gerald Tsai,
Jr., and $18,400,000 to its President, Kenneth A. Yarnell.4
There is evidence that not only have many corporations
foregone the deduction, but a number have also added a "gross
up" to the compensation paid to executives to take account of the
tax imposed by section 280G; that is, they increase the payment
made by an amount equal to the taxes that the executive will be
required to pay.42 Thus, instead of eliminating or minimizing
golden parachutes, the effect of the tax imposed by section 280G
is to make such payments more expensive to the corporations.
Therefore, neither with respect to ordinary compensation nor
with respect to compensation contingent on a change in control
has the Code proven a very meaningful curb on executive com-
pensation.'
4 See KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 182 (1991).
41 See id.
4 See Tate & Lyle v. Staley Continental, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9813, 1988 WL 46064,
at *3 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (discussing tax "gross-ups" with the effect of compensat-
ing parachute beneficiaries for the federal excise tax and adding $13.8 million in
cost to the corporation); Brownstein & Panner, supra note 4, at 34; Martin, supra
note 39, at 246 (asserting that there is "no reason to expect that corporations would
be unwilling to forego the corporate deduction and increase the payment to corpo-
rate officers to offset the excise tax"); Ellen E. Schultz, More-Equal Benefits Go to
Some Top Executives, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1993, at C1, C17 (stating that companies
will restore lost benefits when government puts limits on executive compensation).
43 There are several other tax code provisions that have some effect on compen-
sation paid to executives. With respect to pensions, there are limits on the amount
of a pension benefit which can be provided to executives under tax-qualified pension
plans. The Code limits how much compensation will be considered for purposes of
calculating pension benefits, how many benefits may be paid by pension plans and
how much executives can save for retirement on a tax-deferred basis. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 415(b) (1994) (imposing limits on contributions to and benefits paid by pension
plans); iaL § 402(g) (imposing limits on elective deferrals an individual can exclude
from gross income in any year); id- § 401(a)(17) (limiting how much compensation
can be considered in the calculation of pension benefits). Additionally, the Code lim-
its the amount of incentive stock options, those which receive favorable tax treat-
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II. SHOULD WE USE THE TAX CODE AS A WAY TO POLICE
ExEcuTIvE COMPENSATION?
The Code contains both a general reasonableness limit on
deductibility of compensation paid to executives and several
specific provisions that limit deductibility. It is clear that these
limits are not now operating to affect executive compensation in
a significant way. The question is whether the Code can and
should serve as a more aggressive constraint. In order to answer
that question, Congress' goals in this area must be identified.
Then both the goals and the ability of the Code to achieve them
can be evaluated.
Before examining any non-revenue raising goals Congress
may have in this area, it is necessary to address the claim made
by some commentators that the Code is merely intended as a
revenue-raising document and is not a "proper venue for the
implementation of social policy. ' 4 Such a claim is simply unsup-
portable. There are numerous instances of the Code being used
to shape social policy, ranging from the adoption tax credit,45
with its goal of promoting adoptions, particularly of minority
children,46 the targeted jobs tax credit,47 with its goal of providing
job opportunities for certain disadvantaged groups,48 the low-
ment, that can be exercised in any one year. See 26 U.S.C. § 422(d). Although these
provisions will have an effect on the individual components of executive compensa-
tion, they are not likely to affect the overall level of compensation.
44 Ryan, supra note 20, at 372.
45 See 26 U.S.C. § 23 (1997) (allowing an individual credit for qualified adoption
expenses paid or incurred, up to $5000, or a credit of $6000 in the case of a child
with special needs).
"See S. REP. NO. 104-288 (1996) (explaining that the purpose of the adoption
tax credit is to help families defray adoption costs, and to promote the adoption of
minority children); 142 CONG. REC. E787-02 (May 10, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Stokes) (describing the adoption tax credit as an effort to facilitate the adoption of
children, and to decrease the time that children spend in the foster care system);
142 CONG. REC. H4766-01, 4766 (May 9, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pryce)
(emphasizing the goal of legislation to promote and encourage adoption); 142 CONG.
REC. H4766-01, 4769 (May 9, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hall) (detailing legislative
aim to place a greater number of children into loving families).
47 See 26 U.S.C. § 51 (1997) (offering employers a credit against tax liability for
hiring individuals from nine target groups who traditionally have had difficulty ob-
taining and holding jobs).
See Targeted Jobs Tax Credit: Testimony of Rep. Rush Before the Subcomm.
on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 1994 WL
527376 (Sept. 29, 1994) (supporting the targeted jobs tax credit and recommending
improvements to the program which aims to employ economically disadvantaged
citizens).
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income housing tax credit program,49 with its goal of encouraging
investment in low-rental housing," the charitable contributions
deduction,"' which aims at encouraging contributions to appro-
priate causes," and the "sin taxes,"53 which have the goals of pre-
venting unhealthy lifestyles and promoting consumer well-
being.' Congress consistently uses the tax laws to accomplish
objectives that are not tax related. Thus, if one is convinced that
there is an important non-revenue related goal that can be
achieved by affecting the deductions allowed for executive com-
pensation, there is no reason not to use that tool.55
The first possible goal that could motivate Congress is a de-
sire to affect the amount or type of compensation paid to execu-
tives. There is evidence to suggest that the Code provisions ad-
"9 See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1997) (allowing owners of qualified low-income buildings
to claim housing credit allocations received from state or local housing credit agen-
cies).
0 See id.
r" See id. § 170(b)(1)(A) (allowing deductions for charitable contributions includ-
ing gis to churches, educational organizations, or other private foundations).
See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 160-61 (1976) (arguing
that the primary purpose of the charitable contributions deduction was to encourage
charitable giving). The charitable contribution deduction appears to be quite effec-
tive in stimulating charitable giving. See Gerald A. Auten & Gabriel Rudney, The
Variability of the Charitable Giving by the Wealthy, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING:
STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 72, 79 (1989); Nina J. Crimm, Tax Plans for the
Twenty-First Century: Medical Incentive Vouchers Address the Needs of Academic
Health Centers and the Elderly, 71 TUL. L. REV. 653, 688 (stating that the charitable
deduction appears to be quite as effective as "a stimulus for charitable giving"); Fred
Stokeld, Charities Fear Loss of Deduction under Flat Tax Proposals, 70 TAX NOTES
935, 936 (1996) (citing figures from IRS Statistics of Income Division that individual
income tax deductions for charitable contributions was approximately $100 billion).
See 26 U.S.C. § 5001 (1997) (imposing on all distilled spirits produced in or
imported into the United States a tax at the rate of $13.50 on each proof gallon and
a proportionate tax on all fractions thereof); 26 U.S.C. § 5701 (1997) (imposing taxes
on cigar, cigarette, and tobacco products based on relative weight or size).
See Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners? The Economic and Political Inequity
of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443,
443 (1996).
' Indeed, the Code is already being used that way. Section 280G itself was not
passed to address any abuses of the income tax laws, but to address compensation
amounts that were viewed by Congress to be unreasonable. See DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE SENATE COM. ON
MAR. 21, 1984 ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. 175, 195 (Comm. Print 1984);
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-861, at 757, 852 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1445, 1540. Congress' purpose in enacting section 280G was also to discourage hos-
tile acquisitions, another goal that is not tax-related. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H.R. 98-4170,
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., at 174, 199-200 (Comm. Print 1984).
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dressing executive compensation are motivated by this desire."
As to whether the Code could become a more effective means
of affecting the amount of executive compensation than it is to-
day, the IRS could be encouraged to challenge deductions for ex-
ecutive compensation on the grounds that the amounts paid are
unreasonable. The argument as to the feasibility of this ap-
proach is that while the courts "acknowledge that the issues are
complex, that the exercise of judgment is necessary, and that the
outcomes will lack precision,"57 they do engage in the task of
analyzing the reasonableness of compensation in the close corpo-
ration context.5 In that context, courts have developed a list of
factors to be used in deciding whether a deduction applies.
These factors include the employee's qualifications and skill, the
scope of her responsibilities, her role in the success of the busi-
ness and a comparison of the compensation in question with the
compensation of comparable individuals.59 One can argue that
these factors are no less relevant in the context of compensation
paid to executives of publicly-held corporations.
There are, however, some difficulties with promoting this
approach. Ironically, one of those problems is section 162(m),
which was enacted in response to criticisms of the levels of ex-
ecutive compensation. To the extent that section is viewed as
6 See supra note 18 (suggesting Congressional concerns with the type of com-
pensation) and note 32 and accompanying text (suggesting a concern with the
amount of compensation); see also 141 CONG. REC. S11201-03 (Aug. 2, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Boxer) (expressing concern with the amount of executive com-
pensation when compared to that of employees); 140 CONG. REC. H8055-01 (Aug. 12,
1994) (agreeing to the imposition of limits on executive compensation within certain
governmental departments); 138 CONG. REC. S14861-01 (Sept. 24, 1992)
(illustrating Congressional concern with regard to the amount of compensation as
compared to executive performance).
57 Vagts, supra note 15, at 257.
'a See Contract Reprod. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 600 (1987); Di-
verse Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 525 (1986); Ray Clymer Jr. and
Denison Poultry & Egg Co. v. Commissioner, 47 TCM (CCH) 1576 (1984); Demian,
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 311 (1983).
69 See supra note 58. One of the earliest cases to provide a comprehensive list of
factors to be considered in making the reasonableness determination was Mayson
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949). Mayson estab-
lished the factors to be used in the determination of reasonable compensation, in-
cluding past compensation, the nature of the employee's work, and the difference
between employee salaries and stockholder distributions. See id. at 119. For a de-
tailed discussion of some of the more significant factors used by courts, see Charles
A. Barragato, Sustaining a Deduction for Reasonable Compensation, 61 CPA J. 10
(1991).
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defining reasonableness at the $1 million level, the addition of
that section of the Code may make it difficult for courts to chal-
lenge compensation that is less than $1 million. That is unfor-
tunate because, depending on the circumstances, $1 million may
or may not be reasonable compensation for a particular execu-
tive. For some executives, it will be too little; for others, too
much.
This leads to the second problem: it is virtually impossible
for an external arbiter to evaluate compensation in absolute
terms. If an amount of compensation paid is what is necessary
to retain a highly prized executive who is being wooed by a com-
petitor, in what sense can it be termed unreasonable? Five mil-
lion dollars to keep a superstar CEO who has been responsible
for turning an ailing company into a high performer and who is
thinking of leaving the company in favor of a more lucrative po-
sition elsewhere is reasonable, whereas five million to an unin-
spired CEO of a sluggish company who has no other job pros-
pects may be termed excessive. Moreover, an amount that may
seem excessive standing alone may be reasonable given an ex-
ecutive's contribution to the corporation. Again, section 162(m)
aggravates the situation. The exclusion for performance-based
plans makes the adoption of such plans more desirable and the
movement towards performance-based compensation makes
judgments of reasonableness even more difficult.
Imagine a complaint that a particular pay for performance plan
provides too much incentive and too little risk-that is, execu-
tives get too much pay in both good times and bad times. A
court would be charged with evaluating the board's judgment
concerning the trade off between risk sharing and incentives.
But because these are "local" decisions that not only lack a de-
terminative conceptual framework, but depend on the peculi-
arities of particular companies and particular industries, it is
difficult to imagine how a court bent on monitoring compensa-
tion decisions would proceed.60
To use the Code more effectively as a means of affecting ex-
ecutive compensation, alternatives to the reasonableness ap-
60 Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: An
Academic Perspective, 792 PRAC. L. INST. 647, 672-73 (1992). Though Gilson is
speaking in the context of the judicial application of corporate law standards, his
comments apply equally to the difficulty of determining reasonableness for purposes
of the Code.
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proach do exist. One could replace the approach taken by section
162 of the Code by simply disallowing deductions which exceed a
stated amount.6'
The effectiveness of such limits is questionable. By defini-
tion, the Code approach holds only the threat of loss of deducti-
bility of compensation. Therefore, these limits will not necessar-
ily change behavior. As experience with section 280G has
suggested, there will be many employers who will decide to pay
whatever compensation they wish, notwithstanding the tax
penalty, simply making compensation more expensive to the cor-
poration.' In fact, that has been the experience with the limits
imposed by section 162(m).0
Additionally, the use of Code limits will always involve one
of two alternatives: an absolute limit on deductible compensation
or an approach that excludes certain forms of compensation from
the limit. The former approach suffers from rigidity. The latter,
as the experience with section 162(m) suggests, renders the limit
meaningless.
Regardless of the potential effectiveness of the Code as an
increased constraint on the amount or type of compensation, it
should not be so used. Compensation is a matter for the market
and private parties and not one requiring government involve-
ment. What corporations pay to their executives, and in what
form compensation is paid, is clearly a business decision between
the company and its owners, the shareholders. While the gov-
ernment is justified in assuring that shareholders are aware of
what executives are paid" and that shareholders have the ability
61 Pensions are an example of such a limit where there is a limit on the amount
of compensation that can be taken into account for purposes of calculating pension
benefits. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(17) (1997). Nothing in the statute or its legislative
history suggests that pension benefits in excess of such amounts are not
"reasonable."
6 See Brownstein & Panner, supra note 4, at 34; Macey, supra note 35, at 12.
63 See supra note 22.
"In 1992, the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") enacted major changes
to its proxy and disclosure rules, which were designed to give American stockhold-
ers of publicly-held corporations a clearer picture of the compensation paid to the
CEO and the other highest paid executive corporate officer. See Executive Compen-
sation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31,327; Investment Company Act,
57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992), as corrected in Executive Compensation Disclosure Cor-
rection, Exchange Act Release No. 31,420; Investment Company Act, 57 Fed. Reg.
53,985 (1992). This involved making changes to the executive compensation disclo-
sure requirements contained in Regulation S-K, as well as changes to Schedule 14A
and Form 10K. See Treas. Reg. §§ 229, 240.14a, 249.310 (1993).
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to object if they are dissatisfied with compensation decisions
made by a corporation's board of directors,' it should not substi-
tute its own judgment on what is paid and how. Therefore, if the
motivation of Congress in enacting Code provisions addressing
executive compensation is to affect the amount or type of com-
pensation paid to executives, the action is inappropriate.
While there is no societal concern (as opposed to concern of
shareholders) implicated by attempting to regulate the amount
and type of compensation, it is possible to articulate a social goal
that focuses on the amount executives are paid in relative terms.
The second possible goal that might motivate Congress to use
the Code to police executive compensation is a social goal: the
desire to affect the relationship between executive compensation
and the pay of rank and file employees. Congress could decide
that "[plublic policy does not support extreme distortions in in-
come" between executives and lower level employees.6
If shortening the distance between the top and bottom of the
pay scale is Congress' goal, the current Code does nothing to fur-
ther that goal, since the current provisions focus solely on the
amount and type of executive pay. It may be possible, however,
to change the Code to promote this goal more effectively. For ex-
ample, Representative Sabo has proposed limiting the tax de-
ductibility of executive compensation to twenty-five times the
compensation of the lowest paid full time worker in the same or-
ganization.67 Unlike the current Code provisions, this approach
In 1992, the SEC also enacted new rules designed to ease substantially com-
munications between shareholders, thus allowing them the ability to mobilize when
unhappy about compensation decisions. See The Regulation of Communications
Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276-01 (1992) (codified at Treas Reg. pts. 240,
249). At the same time, the SEC decided that the issue of executive compensation
was an appropriate subject for a shareholder proxy proposal. See SEC News Release
No. 92-12, Statement of Richard C. Breedon on Executive Compensation Issues (Feb.
13, 1992); see also Northern States Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL
46873, at *2 (Dec. 23, 1993).
"Barris, supra note 23, at 79 (noting statement of Rep. Sabo). This is the view
that leads to proposals like that of Rep. Sabo. See infra note 67 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 9. Ralph Whitworth, executive director of United Share-
holders Association, criticized the Sabo bill as "wrongheaded because it doesn't ad-
dress the central issue, which is pay for performance. It's not how much [executives]
get paid, it's how they get paid." Johnson, M., supra note 22, at 8.
See The Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102d Cong. (1991)
(disallowing a tax deduction for "excessive compensation," defined as an amount
equal to 25 times the lowest compensation paid by the employer for the personal
services of any other employee).
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forces companies to examine the relationship between salaries of
executives and rank and file employees.
This raises the question whether reforming disparity in pay
is a goal Congress should be pursuing. I believe it is not and
that the disparity in pay between executives and rank and file
employees should not lead to government action. From an eco-
nomic point of view, the disparity is irrelevant. The market for
rank and file employees is simply different from the market for
executives. A company will pay its rank and file employees what
it perceives to be necessary to retain an adequately-sized and
productive work force and there is no economic reason why it
should consider executive compensation in determining what
that necessary rank and file pay is. While Congress may have
legitimate social concerns about wealth disparity,' it should find
another way to address those concerns69 that does not involve in-
terfering with a company's business decision in setting the wages
of its employees.
The final goal Congress could have is a revenue-raising one.
Congress could simply decide that there is a limit on the largess
of the federal government in this area. While raising revenue is
always a legitimate use of the Code, it does not appear to be the
goal which Congress is seeking to achieve. If that is to be the
goal, then the executive compensation deduction needs to be
evaluated in conjunction with other deductions or alternative
means for increasing revenue, and not standing on its own.
6 See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY IN THE INCREASING INEQUALITY
OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 5 (1995) (reporting increasing inequality in both income and
wealth); PHILLIPS, supra note 40, at ix (analyzing the combined net worth of the
four hundred richest Americans which trebled from $92 billion in 1982 to $270 bil-
lion in 1989, during the same time that U.S. median family income barely stayed
ahead of inflation).
69 See BOK, supra note 1, at 275-80. If Congress' primary concern is income dis-
parity, it should consider a suggestion made by Derek Bok that would not affect
business decisions. Bok suggests that "the ideal way to remove excessive earnings in
a highly imperfect market" is a more steeply progressive income tax, arguing that
such a proposal will require little or no administrative burden and that it will not
risk driving talented people arbitrarily from one occupation to another. Id. Such a
notion is not new. In 1963, an executive who earned taxable income of over $400,000
had a marginal tax rate of 91%. See CRYSTAL, supra note 15, at 25. In recent years,
we have seen quite high tax rates. Individual income was taxed at a rate of 50%
until 1987 and, as recently as 1968, the rate was 70%. See id. at 150.
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CONCLUSION
What a corporation pays its executives and in what form is a
business decision, appropriately determined by the board of di-
rectors of a company. As long as the ultimate owners of the
company-its shareholders-are aware of what executives are
being paid and have the ability to express displeasure if they do
not like the decisions being made by the board, there is no place
for government in the process. Notwithstanding concerns about
the increasing inequalities of wealth between those at the top
and at the bottom of the economic ladder, Congress should not
attempt to regulate what a company pays its executives in rela-
tion to what it pays its rank and file employees.
While raising revenue is a legitimate use of the Code, raising
tax revenues does not appear to be Congress' goal in enacting the
provisions that currently limit the executive compensation de-
duction. Thus, Congressional motives need to be articulated
prior to attempts of government regulation in this area. Absent
defense of another goal, the Code has no role in policing execu-
tive compensation.
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